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Introduction
They just say: “Go, you brought nothing with you.” The people who come back are often killed at the
border.  We are killed trying to get to our families after we are sent back here alone.
(Johnstone and Simbine, 1998: 170)
These words, taken from an interview of Francisco Chiure in Mozambique on the 16th of March
1996, are a powerful reminder of the realities of modern migration, and the desperation of those
who will do anything to cross the border between Mozambique and South Africa.
Prior to 1994, South Africa was infamous throughout the world for its racialised policies and
seemingly limitless measures of social control.  Despite pressure from the international
community, the previous government showed itself to be stubbornly resistant to change,
reinforcing its control through a police force that was:
‘always in the front line in the enforcement of apartheid … (and) ensured that black
South Africans were kept in their places in segregated and inferior institutions’ (Cawthra,
1993: 1).
This unforgiving nature of the previous government extended to foreigners, including refugees
from the war in Mozambique2, who braved a collection of horrors, including dangerous wild
animals in Kruger National Park (which borders both countries) and a fence generating a lethal
electric voltage in their desperation to avoid border control officials and reach relative safety in
neighbouring South Africa.
                                                            
1  Handmaker is an international lawyer and freelance consultant, based in the Netherlands and Singh is human
rights training coordinator at Lawyers for Human Rights, South Africa (formerly attorney at White and Case law
firm, New York City, USA).  The authors gratefully acknowledge the extensive feedback received from Jennifer
Moore, Associate Professor in the School of Law, University of New Mexico, USA.
3While South Africa has since seen dramatic political changes in recent years, and Mozambique
too has at last achieved some degree of political stability3, migration to South Africa from
Mozambique and other countries has continued and perhaps even increased.  The numbers of
migrants entering South Africa in recent years continue to be heavily contested, ranging from
conservative estimates of several hundred thousand, to heavily exaggerated figures ranging into
the ‘millions’, supported by ‘pseudo-scientific’ data (Crush, 1997).  Whatever the numbers, it is
clear that the nature of most regional migration is ‘circular’, with migrants expressing little wish
to remain permanently (Crush, 1999: 128).  In such a context, it is difficult to understand that
while employer demand plays a significant role in stimulating cross-border migration,
‘enforcement targets employees, not employers’ (Ibid: 131).
Popular perceptions of a ‘flood’ of foreigners, lack of capacity to make timely, reliable
determination on refugee status, a policy framework wholly inadequate to meet the needs and
reflect the realities of modern migration trends, and numerous other factors have presented
considerable challenges to the South African government in the post-1994 era, characterised by
democracy and a commitment to human rights.
Attempts to deal with this issue through policy reform in South Africa have been fraught with
difficulties, with the government torn, on one hand, between its domestic and international
human rights obligations and, on the other, with growing pressure to address the ‘immigrant
problem’.  During the course of these debates, much reliance has been had on the United States
migration policy and border control mechanisms, to the extent that US officials have been
involved in conducting surveys of South African border control mechanisms and making
recommendations, conducting training of South African officials and even participating in
government task teams developing policy.  This concerns us somewhat, since the migration and
border management systems in the United States have not only consistently failed to achieve
their objectives, but the effects of their implementation have raised a number of serious human
rights concerns as well (HRW, 1995 and 1997).
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2  It is by now very well established that this war, described by a US State department official as ‘one of the most
brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II’ (Footnote 31 in Prohibited Persons, Ibid.)
was part-sponsored by the South African government itself.
3  However, since the maintaining of a Peace Accord between warring forces in 1992, Mozambique has been beset
with a crippling economy and environmental disasters generating a “new generation” of forced migrants, not least
the devastating floods that displaced hundreds of thousands in 2000.
4It is our intention in this report to do three things, namely: to survey the operation of migration
policy and border management mechanisms in South Africa and the United States, to critique
the desirability of drawing on US policy and border control mechanisms in the South African
context and, finally, to identify areas for further research.
Ultimately, we believe it is important to broaden the dialogue on migration policy and border
control / management, both to share positive experiences and to learn from the mistakes of the
past.  Indeed, the story of Francisco Chiure could just as easily be one of a migrant from Latin
America, crossing the border between Mexico and the United States of America and leaving
behind economic destitution (and possibly persecution) to seek a better future in a ‘land of milk
and honey’4.
In section I of this study, we provide an overview of migration policy in South Africa and
attempts to reform this policy; section II discusses recent developments in US Migration Policy.
Section III discusses the mechanisms of border control in the implementation of this policy in
South Africa, asking whether South Africa may be ‘learning from bad practice’.  Section IV
addresses various measures of gaining entry to South Africa, focussing on temporary entry,
access to the refugee status determination procedure and detention.  Section V discusses the
extent to which one can secure residence in South Africa, while Section VI addresses the limits
and capacity to challenge both detention and removal.  Section VII briefly highlights key rights
of foreigners and Section VIII to an extent summarises the above by highlighting certain
dominant themes influencing migration policy in both South Africa and the United States,
ranging from security and control and national politics to resource issues and inter-governmental
relationships.
                                                            
4  This expression, commonly used to describe the USA, has been used in recent years to describe the position of
South Africa in relation to her poorer neighbours – NIDS: 1997)
5Section I: Migration Policy Development in South Africa
South Africa’s policy on entry and residence, including temporary migration, immigration
(permanent residence) and refugee determination, has fallen under the Aliens Control Act, an
omnibus piece of legislation that (even in its latest versions) was very much rooted in the
previous government’s over-arching policy of apartheid (Peberdy and Crush: 1998).
Efforts to Reform
Attempts to overhaul the country’s migration policies began in 1995, with a statutory
amendment5 to the Aliens Control Act No. 96 of 1991.  It was Parliament’s intention to bring the
Act more in line with the country’s new constitution.  Before being amended in 1995, s. 55 of
the Act even provided that no decision of the Department was reviewable by a court or tribunal,
and persons could be held in detention indefinitely, without judicial review (Handmaker, 1999).
The 1995 Amendment removed this provision and provided that detention for periods beyond 30
days ought to be subject to review, although in practice it appeared that this was rarely
happening (Ibid)6.  In short, despite the reforms, there were still concerns that the Aliens
Control Act fell far short of constitutional expectations (Klaaren, 1998).  Clearly more
comprehensive reforms were necessary.
The development of a refugee policy as part of the Department’s broader migration framework
has received greater priority.  From 1994 until the 1st of April 2000, with the support of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the South African government had
been processing individual applications for political asylum, treating asylum seekers as
“exceptions” under the Aliens Control Act.  Implementation, however, had its fair share of
problems (Handmaker, 1999).
Following a well-organised lobby on the part of NGOs, a Refugees Act was passed at the end of
                                                            
5 Aliens Control Amendment Act, No. 76 of 1996
6  This was one of the results of a Human Rights Commission inquiry, which from March 1998, investigated the
manner in which persons are apprehended and detained under the Aliens Control Act.  Participating NGOs
included Wits Law Clinic, Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Lawyers for Human Rights.  ‘Illegal? Report on
the apprehension and detention of suspected undocumented migrants’, South African Human Rights
Commission, February 1999.  Available at http://www.lhr.org.za/refugee/hrcreport.htm
61998.  However, expectations of a more progressive approach towards refugees were quickly
diminished.  Regulations, which did not come until two years afterwards in April 2000, made
clear that the South African government intended to severely limit access to refugee protection
and reduce the reception conditions of asylum seekers in a bid to “discourage” illegal migration,
notwithstanding the fact that persons genuinely fleeing persecution would have little, if any,
means to survive on their own, and that those intending to enter on non-Refugee Convention
grounds would be no less discouraged, since their intention was simply to gain entry to South
Africa in the first place.  Further, proposed amendments to the Act would have the effect of
diluting the rights contained in the Refugees Act even further7.
A more general policy on immigration and border management has taken longer to develop.  In
1997, a draft Green Paper on International Migration was released, the product of an NGO-
managed consultative process.  It contained progressive recommendations aimed at scrapping
the current system based overwhelmingly on “security” concerns, in favour of one that
responded, more pragmatically, to South Africa’s objective labour needs.  Unfortunately, the
events that followed disclosed an explicit rejection by the South African government of most of
these ideas, and a return to a policy of control, motivated largely by security concerns.
Policy development in South Africa has seen a great deal of involvement from advisors of the US
Government.  The US government had taken a major interest in South Africa’s policy
development since at least 1996/97, when it sent over a team of border control officials to
review South Africa’s air, land and sea parts and provide recommendations (NIDS, 1997).
These recommendations became the basis of South Africa’s “Collective Approach to Border
Control” (Ibid.), which since 1997 has regulated the co-ordination of border control between the
four responsible authorities, namely the South African Defence Force, Revenue Service
(customs), Police Service and Home Affairs.
Involvement of the US Immigration Service
In 1997, the US Immigration Service established an office in Johannesburg, joining officials of
                                                            
7  See details of the amendment and explanatory memo at:  www.lhr.org.za/refugee/docs.htm
7the United Kingdom who had been investigating cargo operations in Durban8.  The office has
since maintained an advisor from the INS to the present day.
The US government was further acknowledged for its role in the policy developments that
followed, and was represented on the “Task Teams” that produced the White Paper on
International Migration, released for public comment on May 1999, and various, subsequent
Draft Immigration Bills, the most recent (at the time of writing) being released for comment in
June 2001.
Moving Backwards? An examination of the Proposed Immigration Regime
Both the White Paper and Bill bear little resemblance to the Green Paper, containing provisions
that formalise restrictive practices towards immigration.
There are a number of areas of concern that can be raised about the proposed documents,
which for some considerable time were the subject of much political wrangling between the
South African government, Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs and the
Department of Home Affairs9.
Two broad areas for observation were raised by South African NGO Lawyers for Human Rights
(LHR) in response to the White Paper (LHR, 1999)10, namely: the continued, ideological
approach of control over management and fear that certain provisions contained within the
White Paper and Bill would fuel the existing xenophobia in the country.
It has been LHR’s contention that:
‘The immigration regime proposed falls seriously short of the standards of human rights
protection afforded non-South Africans in this country, and that additional thought ought
to be given to its viability in discussion with various government and non-governmental
                                                            
8  ‘US to lend a hand in SA’s fight against illegal aliens’, Sunday Independent, 22 June 1997.
9  See, e.g., ‘Commentary on Immigration Bill impasse’, Financial Mail (South Africa), 23 March 2001
10 LHR first published its concerns regarding the White Paper in ‘Refugees and the ‘Community’: A preliminary
review of the White Paper on International Migration’, Botshabelo, April / June 1999, vol 2, no 2, Lawyers for
Human Rights.
8role-players.’
LHR raised concerns over the White Paper’s style of ‘border control’ that reflected a continued,
uncompromising approach, believing such to be not only very expensive, but “of limited benefit,
since it has been credibly established that most persons are entering South Africa for short
periods of time and returning”11.
Furthermore, inability to deal with high levels of corruption has undermined the system, not only
in the minds of those victim to these abuses of authority, but in the view of South Africa’s
parliament, which in 1999 accused the Department of Home Affairs of ‘not doing enough’ to
address the problem12.
LHR also opposed the government’s proposal to make South Africa ‘less attractive’ to potential
migrants – indeed it is by now well established that such punitive measures are often of only
temporary benefit and are always in danger of violating human rights norms.  As migration
expert, Bimal Ghosh, has concluded:
‘As for the punitive measures, in order to be effective as a deterrent to future inflows,
they need to be exceedingly onerous so that the human and financial cost of irregular
entry may outweigh the anticipated benefits.  But such draconian measures inevitably
raise issues of human and civil rights in mocdern democracies.’  (Ghosh, 1998: 148).
Ghosh goes on to warn that, apart from failing to stem irregular migration, such stringent
measures have the highly undesirable effect of turning migrants to traffickers to gain entry into
a country.
Xenophobia – entrenching itself in policy?
South Africa has been experiencing a disturbing rise in attacks against foreigners in recent
                                                            
11 The ‘circular’ nature of migration is well documented by the Southern African Migration Project: see  J. Crush,
‘The Discourse and Dimensions of Irregularity in Post-Apartheid South Africa’, International Migration, vol. 37,
no. 1, 1999, p. 125-151, and numerous SAMP “Policy Papers”, available at www.queensu.ca/samp
12 ‘Home Affairs not doing enough about corruption’, SA Press Association (Parliament), 20.10.1999
9years, both directed by the general public towards foreigners (Handmaker, 2000)13 and by the
police in its aggressive enforcement of the immigration law in a manner that resembles the
previous government’s earlier enforcement of the notorious pass laws (Handmaker, 1997; HRW,
1998; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001).
Arguably one of the greatest sources of anti-foreigner sentiment is the mis-perception that
South Africa is faced with a ‘flood’ of migrants from neighbouring countries (Crush, 1999),
spurred on by sensationalist media reports (FXI, 1999), and an increasingly widespread belief
that strong controls are needed to counter this.  The ‘moral panic’ that has been created by this
perception fuels concerns by the average South African over unemployment, lack of access to
basic social services and health care, inadequate education, etc. and has spawned an aggressive
enforcement of the provisions of the Aliens Control Act.  While it cannot be denied that there
has been an increase in migration to South Africa since the dismantling of apartheid, there is
scant evidence to suggest that this is anywhere near the scale claimed by politicians and popular
media.
The policy framework proposed by the South African government in the Migration White Paper
and Immigration Bill suggests greater involvement of the community in border control:
In this White Paper administrative and policy emphasis is shifted from border control to
community and workplace inspection with the participation of communities and the
cooperation of other branches and spheres of government… an interdepartmental
committee will be established to coordinate law enforcement and community action.
(WPIM, 1997: Executive Summary)
This approach seems to be motivated by a belief that the community not only has a ‘vested
interest’ (see below), but is in fact responsible for contributing to border control efforts, in the
same way that they are responsible for reporting crime.
it is possible to promote a different management of migration issues which makes a
                                                            
13  A particularly disturbing incident involved an attack on a train against three foreigners by a mob of South
Africans demonstrating against unemployment.  All three foreigners, who were selling sweets and other items to
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community responsible for cooperating with internal policing actions to ensure that illegal
immigrants are not attracted to South Africa.
(WPIM, 1999: section 4.4.1)
Finally, while the policy documents continue to stress reliance on ‘the community’ to assist in
detecting undocumented migrants, there is merely tacit recognition that there is a danger that
such an approach will lead to an increase in xenophobia.
The I.S. should enforce immigration laws within each community and cooperate with
police structures and community interests to ensure that illegal aliens are not harboured
within the community and that the community does not perpetrate crimes against aliens
or display xenophobic behaviour (WPIM, 1999: section 5.3).
Most worryingly, perhaps, such an approach draws heavily on nationalistic sentiment.
Theoretically, the migration policy could choose to shape the future composition of the
South African population by giving preference to certain types of individuals who are
deemed to be more desirable as members of our national community than others.
(WPIM, 1999: section 7.1)
This approach further draws, to a significant extent, on the recommendations of the INS
(below), based on experiences in the USA that make use of the ‘community’ in enforcing
migration control, as discussed in the following section.
Beyond the actions of the police and other agents of border control, LHR warned that the “the
migration policy itself can potentially contribute to xenophobia as much as the government’s
enforcement of it” (LHR, 1999: 4).  Apart from the obvious need for media and politicians to
restrain themselves from deliberately making anti-foreigner statements, it was felt that the
policy itself ought to not only include a commitment on the part of the government to
proactively combat xenophobia, through such initiatives as the Roll Back Xenophobia
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
passengers, were killed, either thrown from the window into the path of another train, or chased to the roof where
they were electrocuted.  ‘Train from hell to Irene Station’, Pretoria News, 4 Sept. 1998
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campaign14, but reject any approach that relied on the community to actively contribute to
border control initiatives since such an approach can in many instances ‘fan the flames’ of anti-
foreigner and racist sentiment.  Such anti-xenophobia initiatives must attempt to respond to the
highly complex nature of xenophobia in South Africa, with origins ranging from the divisive,
racist policies of the past to South Africa’s long-term isolation from the rest of the African
continent (Morris, 1998, Bouillon, 1996).
While the government’s implementation of the new legislation will obviously be the ultimate
indicator, recent analyses indicate that the future migration policy of South Africa will not draw
from the White Paper as much as was previously thought15.  Successive draft Immigration Bills
put forward by the Department of Home Affairs have so far not won the support of the
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, which has oversight over all policy relating
to migration.  However, with the notable exclusion of the proposed immigration service, it
seems clear from the latest draft Immigration Bill (presented for comment at the time of writing)
that many of the punitive and control elements proposed by the White Paper, recommended by
the INS and indeed contained in the old Aliens Control Act, will in fact be incorporated in the
final policy.  Thus, we feel it is worthwhile carefully examining both the content and experiences
of implementing the migration policy of the US.
                                                            
14  Further info:  www.sahrc.org  <or>  www.lhr.org.za/rollback.rollback.htm
15  E-mail from V. Williams (SAIMMIG e-mail discussion list, 18.5.01:  “The white paper as we know it is being
ignored”.
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Section II: Overview of US Migration and Asylum Policy
The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), part of the US Ministry of
Justice, is responsible for all aspects of cross-border movement of people into the USA, ranging
from policy matters to implementation.  Responsibility for cross-border movement of goods falls
under the authority of US Customs.  Border enforcement is provided by the US Border Patrol,
which is part of the INS.
The INS Immigration Officers process entry documents at the border, make initial assessments
of a person’s documented status, and make decisions on asylum and immigration applications
and applications for naturalisation.  INS officers may also decide to detain persons pending a
final decision on their immigration status.  An immigration judge (also falling under the authority
of the Ministry of Justice), following a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, may review
these decisions in one of various immigration courts situated throughout the country.  The US
State Department / Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also involved to the extent that it processes
applications for visas granted overseas through its consulates and embassies, and is involved in
setting priorities for the admission of resettled refugees from camps overseas.
US Asylum Policy
United States’ asylum law derives from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the Convention’s 1967 Protocol, the latter of which was ratified in 1968 (Pistone, 2000).
With the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the Protocol’s non-refoulement obligations were
implemented into U.S. law.  Specifically, the Refugee Act authorizes the Attorney General to
grant asylum protection to refugees present in the United States (Id).  According to the United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United States granted asylum to 16,810
persons in fiscal year 2000 (INS: 2001).
The passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) radically altered United States asylum law.  Significantly, there are three aspects to
IIRIRA which have increased the barriers to gaining refugee status and radically affected the
rights of asylum seekers in the United States: (1) asylum seekers are required to file their
13
application for asylum within one year of their arrival, except in cases where there has been
substantial changes in their home country; (2) the procedures for deportation and exclusion
have been dramatically revised whereby INS officials now have the power of summarily deport
asylum seekers – known as “expedited removal” in the legislation; and (3) mandatory detention
of asylum seekers.  Further, this legislation virtually eliminated all discretionary power of agency
officials to grant exceptions to individual immigrants.16
Under expedited removal procedures, refugees arriving at a U.S. port of entry without proper
travel documents or documents suspected of being fraudulent must overcome onerous
procedural hurdles before they are eligible to apply for asylum at a removal hearing before an
immigration judge.17 First, aliens are interviewed by INS officers whose function is to prohibit
unauthorized entry in the United States.  Refugees who claim asylum are then subject to a
second interview by an asylum officer to assess whether they have a “credible fear” of
persecution.  Following the “credible fear” interview, individuals who deemed not to have a
credible fear of persecution are subject to immediate deportation or “expedited removal.”  If an
individual passes the credible fear interview, whereby they display a credible fear of being
persecuted in their home country then they are placed in detention.
US INS Detention Policy
The INS uses three types of detention facilities for asylum seekers: government owned Service
Processing Centers (SPC), operated by the detention and deportation branch of the INS;
contract facilities which are run by private prison corporations; and state, local and county jails
where the INS rents beds and asylum seekers share space with criminal inmates (Pistone,
1999).  According to recent testimony before the U.S. Congress, over 22,000 aliens are being
detained by the INS with 60 percent of those being housed in local and county jails.18
The INS now manages the fastest growing prison population in the United States.19  In the past
three years, the number of detainees has tripled with costs of detention reaching $1 billion.
What is perhaps most disturbing about these developments however is that the detention of
                                                            
16 See, Sachs, Susan, “Second Thoughts: Cracking the Door for Immigrants,” The New York Times, July 2, 2001.
17 Pistone, 2000
18 “Religious leaders urge immigration reforms,” Newark Star Ledger, May 21, 2001.
14
resident aliens and refugees in the United States has become a money making operation for
local jails and prisons corporations.   In fiscal year 2000, the INS’ total budget for detention was
$900 million of which $287 million was used to pay for bed space - resulting in a small fortune
to many local governments who are able to sell empty beds in their county jails to the INS.20
Besides the fact that local governments and private corporations are profiting from the
detention of resident aliens and refugees, another major concern which has emerged in the
United States system of detention is the issue of near indefinite terms of incarceration.
Recently, in response to a lawsuit challenging the legality of the INS detention policy, INS
documents revealed that 851 people have been detained for three years or longer.21  INS
records further show that 361 of the agency’s longest-held prisoners include asylum seekers and
others who have not been convicted of any crime requiring detention under recent changes in
asylum laws.22   Recently, however, court challenges to the US INS detention policy have been
made in the cases of Zadvydas and St. Cyr, discussed below in Section VI.
US Border Control Policy
Beginning in the1990s under the policy goals of “controlling” illegal migration to the United
States, the government began committing unprecedented resources to policing initiatives along
the U.S.-Mexican border.   While the effectiveness of these policies has been widely debated
recent reports from various border watchers have revealed two major trends in response to
these  policy initiatives.  First, illegal border crossings have been “spatially restructured to
circumvent areas of high border enforcement” and second, the whole border regions comprising
Texas and California has become increasingly more dangerous to cross for migrants than it was
prior to the new enforcement efforts resulting in increasing fatalities amongst migrants.23
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
19 Minnesota Public Radio, Marketplace Morning Report, June 26, 2001.
20 Id.
21 Malone and Trejo, “Asylum changes sought: Congress hears from detained immigrants,” Dallas Morning New,
May 3, 2001.
22 Malone, Dan, “851 Detained for Years in INS Centers,” Dallas Morning News, April 1, 2001.
23 Eschbach et. al, “Causes and Trends in Migrant Deaths Along the U.S.-Mexican Border, 1985-1988,” University
of Houston.
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Section III: Mechanisms of Control in South Africa – Learning bad practice?
Control of undocumented migrants in South Africa is effected through internal and external
controls.  The racial nature of ‘profiling’ undocumented migrants on the basis of racialised
criteria has led to a number of persons being apprehended and taken into detention when they
possessed a valid visa or permit to reside (SAHRC, 1999).  Mechanisms of internal control have
even led to South African citizens being arrested, on the grounds that they have ‘dark skin and a
strange manner of dressing’24.  The South African Police Service is primarily responsible for
enforcing internal controls, a situation that has led to a number of allegations of corruption and
abuse of power25.
As referred to earlier, external controls are the responsibility of four agencies responsible for
border control: Police, Immigration (Home Affairs), Customs (Revenue) and, to a lesser extent,
the military26.  The Department of Home Affairs continues to be primarily responsible for policy
issues, making administrative determinations on residential status (including temporary permits
for work, business, study or medical reasons), immigration permits and refugee status and
exercises some external border control.  The Police service plays the most substantial role in
terms of manpower, enforcing internal control measures (detecting, apprehending and detaining
suspected undocumented migrants) and manning several of the land border posts, in some
cases jointly with Home Affairs.  In addition to regulating the movement of persons, the police
are also responsible for detecting illegal smuggling of goods and prohibited items (drugs,
weapons, etc.) and, together with Customs, regulating the transport of legal goods.
The role of the military is largely confined to patrolling the perimeter fence that separates South
Africa from neighbouring Mozambique and monitoring electronic detection systems.  Whenever
an unauthorised detection is noted, the military is expected to track down the undocumented
migrant; though as we observed during a short field visit in January 2001, in practice a
substantial number of unauthorised detections are never followed up due to lack of manpower.
                                                            
24  ‘Police assault South African mistaken for illegal immigrant’, The Star, Johannesurg, 11 March 2001
25  The Star, Ibid and ‘Corruption: Swoop on police Illegal Alien Unit’, Pretoria News , 10 September 1998
26  Additional role players mentioned include the National Intelligence Agency, South African Secret Service and
Departments of Trade and Industry, Health, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, Environmental Affairs & Tourism,
Correctional Service, Transport, Public Works, Justice and Welfare (NIDS, 1997)
16
Collective Approach to Border Control
The activities of all four separate governmental authorities responsible for border control are
managed through a ‘Collective Approach to Border Control’ (NIDS, 1997), which was an initiative
begun in mid-1997, seeking to get beyond the previously ‘disjointed’ approach and create a
‘unified and accountable command structure for border control’ (Grobler, 2001).  It followed a
report prepared for the National Inter-departmental Structure (NIDS) on Border Control by The
Operational Working Team on Border Control.
The Report ‘Implementation Plan for a Collective Approach to Border Control’ addressed the
various aims and functions of various levels of border control officials, from the national level to
the port of entry level (NIDS, 1997: 10-11).  It spoke of a phased programme of action, planned
to take place over a one and a half year period, starting middle 1997 and completing at the end
of 1998, intending to bring the three main authorities (Customs, Immigration and Police) ‘under
one roof’, allocating existing staff to new positions and assigning new roles rather than hiring
additional staff (Ibid: 15).
The Report made various recommendations regarding South Africa’s land borders, airports, sea
borders and informal border crossings.  The recommendations aimed at restricting access to
controlled areas at sea borders and airports, but interestingly also recognised the need to
continue maintaining informal border crossings, on the grounds that:
‘communities are being artificially divided by colonial borders, and provision must be
made for estranged families to visit each other’.
More precisely, the Report sought to clarify the roles and functions of the various players
responsible for border control, aiming at ‘uniform guidelines and control mechanisms for ports of
entry’, reducing ‘red tape’ and making provision for the sharing of facilities (in particular
intelligence information and technology).  Further, the Report made recommendations with
regard to (acknowledged) levels of corruption and ‘detention facilities for illegal immigrants’.
The Report was to be followed by a ‘Business Plan’, to be drawn up by the Inter-Agency
17
Structure established by the various authorities agreement to the Plan.  While other reports
were submitted to the NIDS Task Team for consideration27, numerous officials acknowledged
that the NIDS report was particularly influenced by the observations and recommendations of
two reports by the US Customs Service (US Customs, 1997) and US Immigration and
Naturalization Service (US INS, 1997).
SA Report by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service
The report by the US INS was ‘pursuant to a request from the South African Government to the
United States Department of State’ (US INS, 1997: 2).  It was clear that a substantial motivation
for requesting US assistance was a concern over crime28.  The INS Inspection Team, which was
composed of border control and inspections officials based at various sea, air and land border
posts in the United States, was split into four teams, making assessments of a selection of South
Africa’s land borders, seaports and airports.  Its aim was (in part) to ‘provide a working
methodology by which other problems can be identified and attacked’ (Ibid: 12).
The INS strongly encouraged the South African government to prioritise ‘illegal migration’:
‘foremost, the (South African Government) and its citizens must make control of illegal
immigration one of its top priorities’ (US INS, 1997: 4)
Once this was done, the report recommended, the South African government could then
concentrate on resources (staff and technology) and a ‘comprehensive enforcement strategy’.
Observations and recommendations were also made regarding a wide range of issues, including
the organizational command structure, the role of the military, technology issues, personnel and
training, budget and equipment, etc.
The recommendations that were made seemed to be strongly influenced from a solely US
                                                            
27   Other documents mentioned in the report, but so far not made publicly available, include a the ‘National
Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ICOC) Report to the Cabinet committee on Safety and Intelligence
(CCSI)’, ‘The Customs Law Enforcement Task Group (CLETG) document for the Executive Head for SA
Revenue Services’ and ‘A draft document prepared by Mr I Lambinon for the Department of Home Affairs’.
28   According to the report, the request was in relation to the South African Government’s efforts “to assist that
government combat the growing crime problem”, (US INS, 1997: 2).
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perspective, drawn from the experiences of much-criticised INS Programmes such as ‘Operation
Hold the Line’ and ‘Operation Gatekeeper’, with questionable applicability in the local context.
Indeed, the NIDS itself recognised some limitations.  For example, a recommendation that the
South African border officials introduce a policy of ‘fee for service’ (Ibid: 6) was something
ultimately not taken up by the authorities.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine most of the persons
travelling through the border posts being in a position to pay such fees.
The US INS Report recommended that the community be more involved in border policing, on
the (somewhat dubious) claim that ‘the community has a vested interest in border control’ (Ibid:
7).
Emphasis was also placed in the US INS Report on holding train, ship and airline companies
accountable for border control, through a comprehensive systems of fines, believing that this
would be a ‘force multiplier to border control’ (Ibid: 8).
As mentioned earlier, the Report was unequivocal in its belief that the South African government
needed to ‘make control of illegal immigration one of its top priorities’, repeating this statement
both at the beginning and at the end of the report.  While the report claimed that ‘numerous
intelligence documents, both national and international, have concluded that the illegal alien
situation in South Africa (was) out of control’, it did acknowledge the ‘tremendous pressure’ the
authorities in South Africa were facing, ranging from increasing air traffic to porous land
borders. (Ibid: 12)
Somewhat confusingly, the Report also referred to the large numbers of refugees in Africa,
claiming that:
‘People become refugees by weather changes that affect agricultural production and
political changes that affect human rights’ (Ibid: 12)
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Section IV: Who Goes There?29  –  Getting through the gates
In view of the many competing interests, gaining access to South Africa’s territory is made
possible through what have been described as ‘two gates’, namely the Aliens Control Act 1991
and the various bi-lateral treaties between South Africa and neighbouring countries concerning
temporary migrant workers (Crush, 1997).  As mentioned earlier, the Aliens Control Act
currently regulates all aspects of migration / immigration, with the exception of asylum, which is
regulated by the Refugees Act and accompanying Regulations.
Temporary Entry
The Aliens Control Act provides for temporary entry of persons for a variety of conditions,
primarily:  work, business, tourism, study and medical reasons.  Those entering without
documentation, or whose temporary documentation has been revoked for contravening a
condition (for example, staying beyond the period designated in the permit without applying for
a renewal) are considered to be ‘prohibited persons’.  It may be possible to ‘regularise’ one’s
status as a prohibited person, as was the case for former Mozambican refugees (Handmaker,
Johnston and Schneider, 2001) and persons who applied for refugee status and received a
‘section 41’ permit, prior to the coming into force of the Refugees Act 1998 in April 2000
(Handmaker, 1999a: 296).
Regulating Undocumented Entry
Undocumented entry is an administrative offence in terms of the Aliens Control Act and shall
likely continue to be in terms of the (proposed) Immigration Act, although certain methods of
entry (e.g. smuggling) are criminal offences and punishable by imprisonment.  Pressure on the
police to ‘catch’ undocumented migrants in South Africa has resulted in a number of persons
with a valid legal permit and even South Africans considered to be “too dark” or having a
                                                            
29   This expression is partly attributed to the title of an early report from the Human Sciences Research Council, a
(mostly government funded) think tank established in Pretoria in the 1980’s that has traditionally produced a
great deal of research commissioned by the government to justify its policies.  Who Goes There?: Perspectives on
Clandestine Migration and Illegal Aliens in Southern Africa (Ibid)., Minaar and Hough.
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“strange manner of dressing”30 being apprehended, detained and (allegedly) even deported
(SAHRC, 1999).
However, notwithstanding the various administrative controls set up to regulate entry and track
undocumented migrants inside South Africa, the fact is that the authorities are unable to stop
undocumented migration: some officials openly acknowledge this31.
Access to the Asylum Procedure
Technically, it should be possible to apply for political asylum on request at the border and
officials have been trained by UNHCR to recognise potential asylum applicants.  Attempts to
compromise this fundamental principle of international refugee law that an asylum seeker ought
not be punished for his/her illegal entry (e.g. for having transited a ‘safe country’) have been
successfully challenged in court32.
Nevertheless, it is feared that the government’s increasing tendency towards non-entrée,
reinforced by various restrictive entry requirements is having a negative effect on the ability of
asylum seekers to gain access to the asylum determination procedure in South Africa (de la
Hunt, 2000).
Detention
It is possible to detain a suspected undocumented migrant, and this often happens.  Persons
declared to be ‘prohibited persons’ are often sent to Lindela Repatriation Centre, a privately run
holding centre, prior to their deportation.  Asylum seekers who entered the country
undocumented are often detained pending a decision on their asylum application, although the
stated policy of the department is not to hold such persons if it appears that the application will
take ‘unreasonably long to process’ (Handmaker, 1999a: 295).
                                                            
30   ‘Police assault South African mistaken for illegal immigrant’, The Star, 11 March 2001
31   Interview with border control officials in Mpumalanga, 12 January 2001.
32   Departmental Circular No. 59 of 2000 provided that asylum seekers who had ‘transited numerous safe
neighbouring countries to reach the RSA … should be referred back from where they come from.  If they insist
on entering the Republic they should be detained.  South African NGO Lawyers for Human Rights successfully
challenged this Circular in the courts.   See www.lhr.org.za/refugee/caselaw/lhr.htm
21
Detention may be reviewed by a judge in terms of section 55 of the Aliens Control Act, a
provision also provided specifically in respect of asylum seekers in section 29 of the Refugees
Act.  However, in practice it appears that the s.55 review rarely takes place in practice (SAJHR,
1999).
Section V: Securing Residence
It is fairly well established that the type of migration to South Africa is predominantly circular in
nature and, as Crush has stated, ‘very few migrants have any intention or wish to settle
permanently in South Africa’ (Crush, 1999: 128).  Nevertheless, particularly for persons who
have been resident in South Africa for decades and whose children may have been born and
grown up in South Africa, there is a need for the policy on access to permanent residence to be
rationalised.
It has been the case (in terms of the Aliens Control Act) that permanent residence is available
only on a discretionary basis, and this policy is set to continue in terms of the (proposed)
Immigration Act, with the exception that the Minister’s discretion might be tempered somewhat
through mandatory consultation with an ‘Immigration Advisory Board’.  Where it was once the
‘exclusive domain’ of certain white immigrants to South Africa, recent policy developments have
broadened access to permanent residence to larger groups of people.
In terms of the current legislative and policy framework, there are currently three main ways of
obtaining permanent residence.  The first continues to be through an application to the
Department of Home Affairs, normally following a period of 5 years temporary residence in the
Republic, or on the basis of marriage to a South African citizen or ‘same-sex life partner’
relationship with a South African citizen33.  Attempts to introduce an exorbitant fee to spouses of
South African partners have been struck down by the courts as being unconstitutional34.
                                                            
33   This extension to the rule that only heterosexual spouses were entitled to apply for permanent residence was
established in the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (and others) v. Minister of Home
Affairs (and others), CCT 10/99, decided by the Constitutional Court on 2 December 1999.  Available at:
http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/1999/natcoalsum.html
34   See Dawood (and another) v. Minister of Home Affairs (and others), CCT 35/99, Decided on: 7 June 2000
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The second means of obtaining permanent residence is through a discretionary decision of the
Minister of Home Affairs to ‘regularise’ the status of a person otherwise declared to be a
prohibited person.  This discretionary power was utilised in the last few years on a large scale in
three separate programmes of ‘amnesty’ (Williams and Crush, 1999).  This has been extended in
recent years to: miners who had lived and worked in South Africa for five years, a programme
that later extended to persons from SADC countries who had been employed for the last five
years and finally former Mozambican refugees in South Africa who had not taken part in the
UNHCR-led repatriation programme and decided to stay.  The latter programme was criticised
as, amongst other issues, as having not having learned from the mistakes of earlier amnesties
(Handmaker, Schneider and Johnston, 2001).
Finally, in terms of section 27(c) of the Refugees Act, a refugee:
is entitled to apply for an immigration permit in terms of the Aliens Control Act, 1991, after
five years’ continuous residence in the Republic from the date on which he or she was
granted asylum, if the Standing Committee certifies that he or she will remain a refugee
indefinitely
The government has always proved to be reluctant to extend permanent residence to refugees,
and thus refugee status in South Africa has, with few exceptions, always been temporary
(Handmaker, 1999: 299).  Recent attempts to ‘set back’ applicants with refugee status to
asylum seekers permits was challenged by lawyers in the case of Musa35, leading to a reversal in
this policy.
                                                            
35   Musa (and others) v. Minister of Home Affairs (and others), Case: 28248/2000, High Court of South Africa
(Transvaal Provincial Division), Decided 27.2.2001.  Available at: www.lhr.org.za/refugee/caselaw/musa.htm
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Section VI: Challenging Removal and Indefinite Detention
Much of the litigation in South Africa has been initiated at the stages of ‘rejection’, where the
applicant fears continued persecution (refoulment), has exhausted all administrative remedies
and faces deportation as an undocumented migrant or has been ‘summarily’ and wrongly
determined to have committed a deportable offence.
Such litigation is initiated in terms of South African administrative law, namely judicial review of
administrative decisions, an area of law that is continuing to develop in South Africa, particularly
since the constitution entrenched in law administrative justice guarantees, providing remedies to
an increasing number of persons.
Further, section 55 has been used to great effect by lawyers as a means to challenge continued
detention at deportation facilities such as Lindela Repatriation Centre and, consequently,
removal from the Republic.
Court Challenges in the US
In the US, recent court cases on the issue of detention present encouraging developments, both
in setting certain limits to detention and ensuring the right of detained persons to judicial
review.
The case of Zadvydas v. Davis reached the United States Supreme Court in June 2001 and
helped clarify the issue of indefinite detention.  In the case, the petitioner, Kestutis Zadvydas, a
resident alien born, apparently of Lithuanian parents, in a German displaced persons camp was
ordered deported because of his criminal record.  Since Zadvydas was neither a citizen of
Germany or Lithuania, these countries refused to accept him.  When Zadvydas remained in
custody after the removal period expired, he filed a writ of habeas corpus for his immediate
release from detention.  While the U.S. District Court granted Zadvydas’ writ, the Fifth Circuit
reversed this decision concluding that his detention did not violate the U.S. Constitution because
eventual deportation was not impossible, good faith efforts for removal continued and the
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detention was subject to administrative review.36 In a further appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed to hear the case.
In the case, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s view, first argued by the Clinton
administration and then by the Bush administration, that U.S. immigration laws authorized and
the Constitution permitted indefinite, perhaps even lifelong detention of immigrants adjudged
deportable but unable to be repatriated.37  The Supreme Court found that the government’s
view presented a “serious constitutional threat” under the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due
process with Justice Breyer holding for the majority that after six months of detention, if
deportation did not seem likely in the “reasonably foreseeable future,” the government would
have to produce special reasons for keeping someone in detention.38 Or as Justice Breyer
stated,
“government detention violates the Due Process Clause unless it is ordered in a criminal
proceeding with adequate procedural safeguards or a specific justification outweighs the
individual’s liberty interest.”39
In another case scaling back the power of the United States government to summarily deport
aliens, decided a week before the Zadvydas decision, the Supreme Court ruled in Immigration
and Naturalization Services v. St. Cyr, that judicial review of deportation decisions “is
unquestionably required by the Constitution,” even though the 1996 IIRIRA legislation appears
to bar judicial review.40
In the words of constitutional scholar David Cole, what both the Zadvydas and St. Cyr cases
show is the Supreme Court’s “fundamental recognition” that as “persons” living in the United
States, noncitizens are entitled to protections of the U.S. Bill of Rights “not explicitly limited to
                                                            
36 Zadvydas v. Davis et. al., No. 99-7791, June 28, 2001.
37  In hearing this case the Supreme Court consolidated several cases including the case of a man from Cambodia
who was in detention but ordered deported for criminal activity.  Since the U.S. has no repatriation agreement
with Cambodia, this man, along with thousands of other s from Cuba, Laos and Vietnam faced years of
prolonged detention.  See Greenhouse, Linda, “Justices Place Limits on Detention Cases of Deportable
Immigrants,” The New York Times, June 29, 2001.
38 Id.
39 Zadvydas v. Davis et. al., No. 99-7791, June 28, 2001.
40  Cole, David, “A Legal Battle for Immigrants,” New York Times, July 1, 2001.
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citizens.”41  Further these cases are the most far-reaching decisions thus for the view that the
U.S. Constitution “protects the liberty of all persons in the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence in the United States is unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”42  In
response to these decisions, the INS issued a press release stating that eligible individuals will
be “released from detention soon” but will remain under INS supervision and subject to removal
from the United States.  However, the press release went on to state that most former
detainees will be eligible for work authorization.43
                                                            
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 INS Press Release on Supreme Court Detention Decisions, July 3, 2001.
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Section VII: Rights of foreigners
The rights of foreigners in South African law is also an area of developing jurisprudence, and
notwithstanding the constitution’s equality clause not specifically extending to ‘nationality’, a
number of recent cases have indicated the tendency of the courts to look favourably upon the
rights of foreigners.  One such example concerns access to permanent residence by same-sex
partners.  Another important constitutional court case concerned an application by a group of
foreign teachers to be granted residence on the basis of their employment44.
Rights of access by asylum seeker’s children to study, prohibited by Departmental Regulations,
has also been established through litigation45.  However, as Ohazuruike has written:
while there are no specific laws that aim to discriminate against or to restrict refugee
rights in South Africa, civil society is yet to respond positively (Ohazuruike, 1999:1)
More generally, systematic discrimination against foreigners has been documented by Human
Rights Watch (1998) and the South African Human Rights Commission (1998), leading to a “Roll
Back Xenophobia” campaign (NCRA, 1999) by the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs.  The
campaign focuses on a number of issues, including: violence, media coverage, education and
the conduct of police and civil servants (NCRA, Ibid).
However, since the wording of South Africa’s constitution is broad, extending most of its
provisions to ‘all persons’ or ‘everyone’, there remains ample space for constitutional litigation
(Klaaren, 1996).
Section VIII:  Dominant Themes influencing migration policy
Access to South Africa is regulated by out-dated legislation that the government itself has
ultimately acknowledged is in need of more than simply amendment.  The direction such a new
policy will take, however, will depend on a number of influencing factors that have become
dominant themes in the debates in South Africa, namely: security and control, international law
                                                            
44   Larbi-Odam (and others) v. Minister of Home Affairs (and others), Case CCT 2/97, decided on: 26 November
1997.  Available at: www.lhr.org.za/migration/larbi.htm
45   Matter of Mutambala and others, a case settled out of court.  See: www.lhr.org.za/refugee/circulars/study.tif
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and human rights (especially refugee protection) and the vagaries of South African politics.
Security and Control
Addressing migration in the ‘new’ South Africa has been exceptionally challenging for a
government ill-equipped to operate in a human rights framework.  Indeed, the very same
institutional structures that were set up to enforce the notorious policy of influx control are
currently being utilised by the immigration authorities, including administrative procedures akin
to the treatment of criminal suspects (e.g. fingerprinting) and the use of detention cells that
once held pass law violators.  Further, the enthusiastic efforts of the police to catch ‘criminals’,
particularly in large-scale operations such as Sword and Shield (1996) and Operation Crackdown
(1999) have resulted in the apprehension of suspected undocumented migrants consistently
figuring disproportionately high in arrest statistics46.
Apart from the US-style proposals recommended by INS officials, both in reports and through
participation in policy ‘task teams’, a number of factors are influencing the government’s
preoccupation with a ‘security and control’ agenda. These can be roughly categorised as
operational, national and international factors.
Operational factors include the fact that the police is constantly challenged by a lack of
accountability, lack of co-ordination (both internally and with other authorities responsible for
border control) and a police culture with roots in the country’s apartheid past.  A particularly
disturbing example of this was the release of a ‘police training video’, shot by police officers of
the East Rand Dog Unit.  The video portrayed the police officers’ use of dogs being ‘trained’ on
live human beings, Mozambicans that had been apprehended as suspected undocumented
migrants.  As the Mozambican Minister for Labour remarked: “The images we have seen are
abominable, horrible. It's an assault against human rights.47”
                                                            
46   ‘Police include deportations in crime figures’ (Sapa, 06/11, Pretoria) – reported that, out of a total of 4522
suspects that had been arrested for serious crimes in the police’s Operation Crackdown in the Pretoria area over
the past seven months, 12 were for murder, 23 for rape, 12 for drug dealing and 522 for assault, he said in a
statement.  Nearly 400 illegal immigrants were also netted from April to October.
47   Mario Sevene, Mozambique Minister of Labour, reacting to the police dog “training video” portraying
Mozambican nationals being set upon by dogs and police officers, PANA, Maputo, 9.11.00.
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The entrenched racism within the South African police force, amongst immigration officers and
defence force operatives persists, whether displayed by a black or white official.  The victims of
alleged physical attacks and corruption are almost invariably black and generally of African
decent, the implicit assumption being that such persons’ lives are of a qualitatively lower
standard than others.
National factors that have motivated the security and control mindset certainly include
political pressures, with the Ministers of Safety and Security (Police), Defence and Home Affairs
(Immigration) all at various occasions making statements that foreigners were a ‘threat’ to the
social fabric of the nation, were criminals, brought disease, etc.48  The impact of such
statements confirms the emerging general sentiment in South Africa, exacerbating the rising
xenophobia.  Further, the training received by police officials continues to stress ‘racial profiling’,
as confirmed in the recent arrest of a South African woman (referred to earlier) who was ‘too
black’ and had a “strange manner of dressing”49.
Finally, there are international factors that have motivated the government’s preoccupation
with security and control.  It is claimed that South Africa is increasingly being seen as a
desirable location for international crime syndicates, including traffickers in drugs (both destined
for the South African streets or to be re-routed elsewhere in the world) and people (particularly
from Asia).  Clearly such trends, if they are in fact as real as they are claimed to be, will be
exceptionally difficult issues for the under-resourced South African authorities to tackle.
International Law and Human Rights
The South African government has repeatedly committed itself to human rights, and is keenly
sensitive of its international image in this regard.  Consequently, certain officials in government
have made efforts to condemn xenophobia, both institutionally and within the broader South
African society, although this commitment is unfortunately not shared by all within
government50.
                                                            
48   e.g. ‘Kick them out’, Editorial in The Citizen, July 1997
49 ‘Police assault South African mistaken for illegal immigrant’, Ibid.
50  Rights groups slam ‘xenophobic’ official, Mail and Guardian, Nov. 5 to 11, 1999, p. 14
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Nevertheless, official commitment to fostering and protecting a human rights culture is strong in
South Africa, including the country’s commitment to honour the provisions of the UN and OAU
Refugee Conventions.
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